

Africa's Social Policy Trajectories since the Colonial Period

Gender, Liberal Democracy and Social Policy Making in pre- and post-independence South Africa



Africa's Social Policy Trajectories since the Colonial Period:

Gender, Liberal Democracy and Social Policy Making
in pre- and post-Independence South Africa

Newman TEKWA

GETSPA WPE 3 2023

March, 2023

About the Working Paper Series

The GETSPA working papers are research reports published by the Gender Equitable and Transformative Social Policy for Post-COVID-19 Africa (GETSPA Project). GETSPA is a pan-African project with the mission to transform -- through research, advocacy, networking, documentation, and constituency-building activities -- the discourses, approaches to, and cultures of social policymaking and implementation in Africa. GETSPA is under the direction of a technical committee comprising Dzodzi Tsikata (PI), Nana Akua Anyidoho (co-PI), Michael Kpessa-Whyte (co-PI), Charles Abugre, Abena D. Oduro and Ato Kwamena Onoma.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in the working papers are not necessarily those of the GETSPA project, its technical committee, advisory committee, the Institute of African Studies or its partners. While every reasonable effort is made to check factual accuracy in published material, the paper authors are ultimately responsible for verifying claims made in their papers. Neither GETSPA nor the Institute of African Studies will be responsible for errors or inaccuracies in contributions.

Copyright and Reproduction

The authors and the GETSPA Project, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana hold joint copyrights to the working papers. The working papers may not be reproduced in any form of print or electronic publication without the permission of the Technical Committee of GETSPA, who can be contacted at ro.getspa.ias@ug.edu.gh. We ask that requests for permission to reproduce material kindly wait until one calendar year after the first online publication on the GETSPA Website and acknowledge GETSPA as the original, open-access source.

© 2023 The Authors. Published by the GETSPA Project, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana.

under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

ISBN: 978-9988-9240-2-7

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iv
1.0 INTRODUCTION	5
1.1 Historical Overview	6
1.1.1 Periodisation, Dominant Values and Underpinnings	7
1.1.2 Colonial Subjugation (1910-1948).....	7
1.1.3 Grand Apartheid 1948-1993	12
2.0 METHODS AND MATERIALS	16
3.0 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: TRANSFORMATIVE SOCIAL POLICY (TSP)	17
4.0 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS	22
4.1 Education and Skills Training.....	22
4.1.1 COVID-19 and Online Learning in South Africa	25
4.2 Work and Employment.....	26
4.2.1 The Employment Equity Act (EEA) 55 of 1998.....	26
4.2.2 Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of 1995	27
4.2.3 Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) 75 of 1997	27
4.2.4 Skills Development Act (SDA) of 1998	27
4.2.5 Other post-Independence Labour Market Regulations	27
4.2.6 Labour Market Outcomes	27
4.2.7 Gender Employment Gap.....	28
4.2.8 Gender Wage Gap.....	29
4.2.9 Gender Occupational Segregation and Stratification	30
4.3 Social Security and Assistance	31
4.4 Healthcare Provision.....	33
4.5 Land and Agrarian Reform	35
4.6. COVID-19, Social Policy Innovations, Promising and Lasting Influences	36
5.0 CONCLUSION, KEY FINDINGS, LESSONS LEARNT AND	
RECOMMENDATIONS	38
REFERENCES	41
APPENDIX 1	45

ABSTRACT

While the disproportionate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on South African women has been highlighted, it is the depth and breadth of social policies that existed prior to the pandemic and the extent to which they addressed gender that aggravated or ameliorated the plight of women along racial, ethnic and geographical contours. In order to understand how an outbreak of a pandemic interfaced with the existing social policy architecture and the concomitant gendered outcomes, this study adopts a process tracing strategy to trace the trajectory of social policy development in South Africa starting from the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, through the apartheid and post-independence periods up to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. While the legacies of colonialism and apartheid remain important, the character of social policies in South Africa at the time COVID-19 struck were largely a product of the ideational, values and ideological underpinnings of social policy making and development in the post-independence period. The latter proposition forms the crux of this study and opens up the possibility of implementing gender transformative social policies in a post-COVID-19 South Africa. The ideological inconsistency of the post-independence black majority government is reflected in its abandonment of the leftist, people-oriented Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) barely two years into democratic rule to embrace a liberal democratic ideology represented by its adoption of GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) as the country's guiding economic blueprint. This switch has left an imprint of the kind of social policies pursued. Using a gender lens, this paper illustrates the above, drawing examples from five social policy sectors, namely land and agrarian reform; work and employment; education; health and lastly social assistance. While the RDP had an ambitious target of redistributing 30 percent of good farmland to black Africans within five years of independence, by 2016 a paltry 5.3 percent had been redistributed, with only 28.9 percent of land reform beneficiaries being women. A similar pattern was observable regarding work and employment. Despite female labour force participation matching that of their male counterparts, a feat coming at a cost to women due to the absence of the state in shaping women's experience of the 'everyday', pay differentials between women and men remain stubbornly high at 25 percent in a gender disaggregated labour market. The liberal-oriented Child Support Grant (CSG), representing the largest tax-funded social assistance in the country and throughout the continent tends to prioritise the poverty of children more than that of their mothers. Post-independence educational policies have failed dismally to universalise quality education despite huge state resources being channelled towards historically black schools. Only the National Health Insurance (NHI) remains promising as an indicator of the universalist approach to social policy in South Africa that, when applied to education and social security, is the surest way for a gender equitable and transformative South Africa post-COVID-19.

Key words: gender equitable; transformative social policy; GETSPA; South Africa; COVID-19.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The first case of the coronavirus disease in South Africa was reported on the 5th of March 2020. As part of epidemiological measures implemented to curb the spread of the virus, a variety of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) were introduced which included travel bans, event cancellations, closure of schools, restaurants, hotels, workplaces and entertainment centres with a national lockdown announced on the 27th of March 2020. The negative consequences of the implementation of NPIs, particularly the ‘Stay at Home’ advice for everyone categorised as non-essential workers meant that many could not continue with their normal routines thus triggering social and economic hardships that followed racial, class, gender and geographical contours. The government had to respond with urgency to the unfolding livelihood crises, but the success of these emergency state interventions depended largely on the depth and breadth of social policies that existed prior to the pandemic.

In order to understand how an outbreak of a pandemic interfaced with social policies and gendered outcomes in South Africa, this study uses a process tracing strategy to provide a tapestry of social policy development in South Africa. It starts from the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, through the apartheid period that stretched for close to five decades from 1948 until 1993 when the system was formally abolished. While the legacy of colonialism and apartheid remains important, the state of South African society at the time COVID-19 struck largely reflected the kind of policies and ideational underpinnings that framed the social and economic post-independence order. This proposition forms the crux of this study and points to the possibility of implementing gender transformative social policies in a post COVID-19 South Africa.

After this introduction above, the report presents a historical overview of colonial and apartheid social policies, their dominant underpinnings and policy outcomes across race, gender and geography. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the methods used in the research and the conceptual framework that informed the research. Section 4 focuses on the post-apartheid period up to the COVID-19 era and is structured along the five social policy instruments selected for this study namely education, work and employment, social security and assistance, healthcare and lastly land and agrarian reform. It reviews policy developments in each of these social policy sectors and their gendered outcomes. It also discusses COVID-19 experiences in South Africa, the particular social policy innovations introduced and those that promise to be lasting for a gender equitable and transformative post COVID-19 South Africa. Section 5 presents the conclusion, with key findings, lessons learnt and recommendations.

1.1 Historical Overview

While South Africa has a long and complex history, for the purpose of this research, the report traces social policy development from 1652, the date marking the arrival in Cape Town of the first Europeans to settle in Southern Africa, in the form of the Dutch East India Company, led by Jan van Riebeeck (Budeli, Kalula and Okpaluba 2008: 31). These early Dutch settlers calling themselves 'Boers' and developed a dialect known as Afrikaans, found the land inhabited by the Khoikhoi-, San- and Bantu-speaking ethnic groups, subsequently referred to as black South Africans (Burzel 2000: 2). Inter-racial unions between Dutch men and imported female slaves from Malaysia as well as with Khoikhoi and San women produced as descendants the present-day Cape Malays and Cape Coloureds respectively, henceforth referred to as 'Coloureds' many of whom assimilated the 'white' Afrikaans language (Macdonald 1953: 142). With the British seizing control of the Cape Colony in 1795 and changing the official language to English, dissatisfied Dutch colonists began the Great Trek into the interior. They came into conflict with the Bantu people but successfully created two land-locked, white-ruled Boer republics, the independent states of Transvaal (1852-1902) and the Orange Free State (1854-1902) (Macdonald 1953: 143). A short-lived Boer Republic of Natalia was established in 1839 but was quickly taken over by the British who renamed it the Colony of Natal and subsequently annexed it to the British Cape Colony (Macdonald 1953: 142).

With the local Zulu men in Natal refusing to be labourers, the British turned to India to resolve labour shortages and imported over 150,000 Indian indentured servants into present-day Durban to form the base of what was to be the largest Indian community outside India (Hattersley 1950; Macdonald 1953: 142). Thus, was the multiracial configuration of the present-day South Africa constituted, comprising the largest European settlement on the continent, the Dutch and British dating back to the 17th century, the black Africans (Khoikhoi, San and Bantu), the Coloureds and lastly the Indians (Gradin 2019: 553; Mariotti 2009: 2; Hattersley 1950). Before the defeat of the Boers in the Anglo-Boer War – also known as the South African War (1899-1902) – South Africa comprised four independent states, two under British control, namely the Cape Colony and the Colony of Natal and the two Boer Republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State (Jisheng 1987: 18).

The formation of the Union of South Africa on the 31 May 1910 marks a critical turning point in the history of South Africa (Macdonald 1953; 143). The South African Act of 1909 was promulgated by the British Parliament to underpin the formation of the Union of South Africa, which amalgamated the four independent states into one self-governing unitary entity, the British Colony of the Union of South Africa (Budeli et al. 2008: 21; Macdonald 1953: 143). The South African Act of 1909 and the resultant Constitution excluded blacks,

coloured and Indians from political participation and was predicated on a unified colonial racial ideology of segregation across South Africa (Terreblanche 2010: 6; Jisheng 1987: 18; Budeli et al. 2008: 21; Mariotti 2009: 4).

1.1.1 Periodisation, Dominant Values and Underpinnings

After 1910 when the Union of South Africa was formed, the history of social policy development can be categorised into three periods each underpinned with distinct values and ideologies. The first period may be described as colonial subjugation and stretched 1910 to 1948. The latter date marks the advent of the second period, the formal establishment and institutionalisation of the grand apartheid system in South Africa (Bond and Malikane 2019: 13; Budeli et al. 2008: 16). Others such as Gumede (2021, 2020) prefer to use the term ‘apartheid colonialism’ as shorthand for “centuries of a discriminatory system of colonialism and decades of systematic social and economic exclusion of the majority of black South Africans” (2021: 2; 2020). Social policy making during this period, which stretched from 1948 to 1993 when apartheid was formally abolished, was characterised by distinct set of values, ideologies and underpinnings markedly distinguishing it from the earlier colonial period under British rule (Mariotti 2009: 4; Budeli et al. 2008: 16). As argued by Gumede (2020: 3), social policy making under the apartheid regime left the country too deeply divided to be considered a nation. The formal abolition of apartheid in 1993 ushered in the third period under a liberal democratic dispensation (Bond and Malikane 2019: 13; Mariotti 2009: 4; Budeli et al. 2008: 16).

Thus, this report discusses three distinct periods – namely the colonial, apartheid and post-apartheid periods – in terms of the key considerations and dominant underpinnings of social policy making and the social policy issues emphasised or marginalised. The report explores the implications for specific social groups regarding inequalities of gender, race, class and space in each of the highlighted periods, starting with the colonial subjugation period.

1.1.2 Colonial Subjugation (1910-1948)

The dominant influences on social policy development from the period beginning 1910 to 1948 were predicated on racial and colonial discrimination (Bond and Malikane 2019: 13). According to a social policy expert with previous experience working in the government:

*The development of social policy must be located in the history of colonial domination, the historical contours in which we need to place analysis of social policy in South Africa.
(Key Informant Interview, 31 August 2021, Cape Town, South Africa)*

The above was reinforced by a racially exclusionary Constitution proscribing the rights and liberties of the indigenous black African population in all spheres of life (Gradin 2019: 553; Budeli et al. 2008: 21). During this period, a series of oppressive, discriminatory and expropriatory laws were enacted and implemented largely against black Africans. The most notorious, with lasting effects to date, was the Natives Land Act of June 30, 1913 (Republic of South Africa 2019: 15; Terreblanche 2010: 5). This Act was implemented following the recommendations of the South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC) that was set up to investigate why natives were unwilling to work on the mines. It allotted only 7 percent of the land in South Africa for the 5 million black Africans, reserving the rest to only 349,973 white settlers (Budeli et al. 2008: 22; RSA 2019: 15).

Apart from stripping the natives of the right to own land in South Africa, the Act outlawed sharecropping on white farms in addition to prohibiting blacks from renting farms from whites (Terreblanche 2010: 5; Budeli et al. 2008: 22; RSA 2019: 15). Apart from the latent objective of stifling the native, traditional, land-based livelihood to force people to seek employment in the mines, two prominent and enduring outcomes of the Act with gendered and racial inflexions can be discerned. The first relates to the racial and gendered inequitable distribution of land persisting to date, and secondly, the establishment of a /migrant labour system in South Africa that also persists to date (Bond 2007: 200; Bond and Ruiters 2016: 184; Bond 2000: 124). Describing the implication of the latter on gender inequality, during an interview one prominent scholar on the development of social policy in South Africa and the Southern African regions had this to say:

Land dispossessions engendered a migrant labour system in which African men migrated to mining areas while women remained in the rural areas. From a gender perspective, less acknowledged is the super exploitation of the colonial migrant labour system in which rural African women subsidised the capitalist system by making available ultra-inexpensive workers through their provision of child rearing, home-based care for sick/disabled workers.
(Key Informant Interview, 24 August 2021, Durban, South Africa)

While these services by rural women were provided at little or no cost to the colonial government, upon retirement the workers would return to the rural areas with a pittance in the form of a watch, not a pension adequate to live a dignified life (Bond 2007: 201).

In the area of education, the Afrikaners initially had little access to education during the early 19th century due to their geographical dispersion and exclusive dependence on an agrarian-based economy. However, the colonial government spent close to nothing on black education in the rural areas (Bond 2007: 201). Mariotti (2009) argues that during the 1940s and 1950s, black Africans, who constituted 68.3 percent of the total population, were

the most poorly educated relative to the other similarly marginalised but slightly educated population groups comprising the Coloureds and Indians, who constituted 12.4 percent of the total population (Mariotti 2009: 4). The English-speaking whites had a higher level of education between the two white groups, who in total comprised 19.3 percent of the total population in South Africa (Mariotti 2009: 4). The lower educational level of the Afrikaners, which had earlier been almost comparable to that of black Africans at that time may have influenced the development of racially discriminatory labour market policies, particularly when wars and agricultural hardships forced both these two population groups into urban areas to seek employment (Mariotti 2009: 4).

In analysing social policy development regarding work and employment, it is important to note that when industrial development began around 1886 following the discovery of diamonds, the country had no sufficiently skilled labour force (Budeli et al. 2008: 18). As highlighted during key informant interviews:

The discovery of minerals, particularly diamonds, in South Africa saw the influx of Europeans, particularly of British origin, coming with skill to work in the mines as artisans with the Afrikaners almost side-lined.

(Key Informant Interview, 31 August 2021, Cape Town, South Africa)

This suggests that the country's skills shortage that persisted throughout the apartheid and post-apartheid period dates back as early as the late 18th century. Thus, to resolve the shortage, the country relied on skilled immigrant labour mainly of British origin (Budeli et al. 2008: 18). As a result, the less educated Afrikaners were bound to compete with the black Africans for the less skilled jobs that were available but due to the underpinning racial ideology, a series of labour market laws were enacted, which favoured whites, mainly Afrikaners, to the disadvantage of black Africans.

As early as 1911, following the formation of the Union of South Africa, two infamous racial labour market laws were promulgated, namely, the Mines and Workers Act of 1911 and the Native Labour Regulations Act 15 of 1911 (Gradin 2019: 554; Jordan and Ukpere 2011: 1094; Budeli et al. 2008: 21). While black Africans were not much of a threat in the skilled work category, the Mines and Workers Act of 1911, promulgated at the behest of skilled white miners, was meant to preclude any competition from black Africans in jobs requiring a certificate of competency (Gradin 2019: 554; Budeli et al. 2008: 21). Apart from protecting white workers against the use of the more 'attractive' (ultra-inexpensive) native labour by employers, the Act represented an implicit 'job reservation', setting aside high-paying skilled jobs for emigrant white mine workers (Jordan and Ukpere 2011: 1094).

In the same year, the Native Labour Regulations Act (NLRA) 15 of 1911 was enacted (Klaveren, Tijdens, Hughie-Williams and Martin 2009: 8; Gradin 2019:554). Apart from proscribing strikes by black African (male) workers, it came along with Pass Laws specifying where and when black Africans could search for employment whereas white male workers were at liberty to move around or change jobs (Naidoo et al. 2014: 2; Budeli et al. 2008: 21; Jordaan and Ukpere 2011: 1095; Klaveren et al. 2009: 8). The migrant labour system alongside the Pass Laws saw around 2 million African men circulating as migrant labour between their rural homes and urban employment while others commuted in packed buses and trains to and from African townships (Klaveren et al. 2009: 8).

The implications of these colonial labour market policies for particular social groups, particularly the intersectionality of gender and race are apparent. The categorisation of being a 'worker' was equated to being 'male', leading to the establishment of a male-dominated labour market and workplaces in South Africa that discriminated against women (Sinden 2017: 37; Quanson 2014: 1). The Pass Laws, which required employer certification that the black 'male' worker had completed 'his' term of work under contract, discriminated against black African women left in the rural areas with an implicit policy objective to subsidise capital through the reproduction of cheap African labour (Naidoo et al. 2014: 2; Budeli et al. 2008: 20; Jordaan and Ukpere 2011: 1094; Bond 2000: 124).

The Rand Rebellion¹ of 1922 was followed by the promulgation of the Industrial Conciliation (IC) Act of 1924, the first comprehensive labour legislation in South Africa that excluded black Africans from the definition of an 'employee' (Klaveren et al. 2009: 8; Jordaan and Ukpere 2011: 1094; Budeli and Kalula 2008: 23). In the subsequent year, the Wages Act of 1925 was promulgated, allowing wage discrimination by race, class and sex of workers (Jordaan and Ukpere 2011: 1094). Collectively, the IC Act of 1924 and the Wages Act of 1925 instigated and strengthened racial separation/segregationist tendencies in the South African labour market, laying the foundation for the racial and gender wage inequalities that persist to date (Mariotti 2009: 4; Jordaan and Ukpere 2011: 1094; Jordaan and Ukpere 2011: 1094). This was in addition to prohibition of black workers from unionising at the same time as unions established by white immigrant workers excluded blacks from becoming members (Budeli et al. 2008: 20).

¹ A bloody confrontation with the military involving skilled white mineworkers protesting against black/white job competition and requesting differential pay scales.

Social assistance during this period was framed around the ‘poor white problem’ as the Union government was discriminatorily concerned with reducing poverty among whites as highlighted in a key informant interview:

Much emphasis was placed on safeguarding the welfare of elderly whites including issues of destitute white children and white persons with mental health problems.

(Key Informant Interview, 31 August 2021, Cape Town, South Africa)

Thus, a series of social assistance programmes were set up including the Old Age Pensions Act of 1928² (Seekings 2007a, cited in Phiri 2020: 11; Seekings 2006: 3). This was in addition to racially discriminatory State Maintenance Grant (SMG), the sole cash transfer programme that targeted white children living in ‘deserving poor’ white households/families, meant to benefit white citizens while less than 1 percent of black African children had access to the grant (Lund 2007, cited in Zembe 2013: 39; Patel and Plageron 2016: 39). Despite the old age pension being extended to black Africans in 1944, this was at a much lower level of benefits, further indicating the racially discriminatory colonial welfare system (Woolard et al. 2011, cited in Phiri 2020: 11; Bond 2007: 201; Macdonald 1953: 140). Other grants that were in existence included the Disability Grant, the Foster Child Grant for children in foster care, and the Care Dependency Grant meant for ‘full time’ caregivers of children with disabilities (Patel and Plageron 2016: 39).

Apart from highlighting the complex relationship between race, power and the political economy, close parallels can be drawn between the development of the health care system in South Africa and the current COVID-19 pandemic. The outbreak of the influenza pandemic of 1918 saw the death of between 300,000 and 500,00 people (van Rensburg 2012: 83). This pandemic influenced the urgent promulgation of the Public Health Act of 1919 and the creation of a unified health system in South Africa, something that was not conceived of despite the unification of the four republics in 1910 (van Rensburg 2012: 83). It was noted:

“... for the inhabitants of the country of all races and cultures, infectious diseases show no respect for constitutional boundaries, and/or racial, gender and cultural differences, the after effects of the pandemic [were] devastating” (Phillips 1988: 63, cited in Usher forthcoming).

Despite the seemingly progressive developments, the Public Health Act of 1919 marked the genesis of two fundamental challenges facing health care provision in South Africa to date (van Rensburg 2012: 83). First, the Act created the division of public health provision into three tiers comprising the national government at the highest level, followed by the

² A non-contributory (tax-funded) social pension meant to address the ‘poor white problem’ among the white and coloured population groups not covered by occupational retirement insurance to the exclusion of black Africans.

provincial government at the second and lastly the local municipality level (*Key Informant Interview 25 August 2021, Pretoria, South Africa*). Second, it effectively created a separation between public and private healthcare by creating an environment conducive for the unhindered expansion of an independent free market system of health provision and financing (van Rensburg 2012: 83). The Public Health Amendment Act 57 of 1935 that saw the extension of public healthcare to indigenous blacks through the creation of a Native Medical Service was characterised by stark inequalities in the distribution of medical staff and quality of service (van Rensburg 2012: 83). Thus, the colour print was branded on fragmented and racially unequal healthcare provision in South Africa. It is evident that a racial ideology underpinned social policy development in South Africa, an ideology that was discriminatory in all spheres of life from education, health, social assistance, to work and employment (Gradin 2019: 553). Much emphasis was placed on the welfare of the white population while the welfare of the majority black population was marginalised (Gumede 2020: 500; Bond and Malikané 2019: 13). Then came the apartheid period stretching from 1948 to 1993.

1.1.3 Grand Apartheid 1948-1993

The apartheid period in South Africa deserves recognition as a period of key changes not only in the history of the country but also in the values, norms and ideologies that underpinned social policy making in the country. Heralding apartheid in South Africa was the coming to power of the Afrikaner National Party (NP), which used slogans in the 1948 elections based on the ideology of apartheid, a policy or system of segregation or discrimination on grounds of race (Budeli et al. 2008: 31)). While the racially discriminatory policies of the colonial period under British rule laid the foundation upon which apartheid was built, the period 1948 to 1993 saw the formalisation, intensification and deepening of an authoritarian system of racial segregation and minority white dominance into a 'grand apartheid' (Klaveren et al. 2009: 8). The successive NP governments driven by a racist ideology of Afrikaner nationalism, for close to four and half decades implemented segregationist, exclusionary and separatist policies and practices that legitimised social difference and economic inequality so extreme that there was no historical parallel of such a racially ordered society (Naidoo, Stanwix and Yu 2014: 2; Klaveren et al. 2009: 8; Beinart and Dubow 1995, cited in Gradin 2019: 554; Mariotti 2009: 5). This is well captured in the words of one notable social policy scholar on the continent describing grand apartheid in South Africa as both a political and social project:

If apartheid were only a political project, in 1994 with the collapse of 'grand apartheid' racial segregation only inscribed in law would have ended. But if you think of apartheid as a social project you have to think it differently in terms of its cultural foundations, social foundations, including its embeddedness within the ideational mindset of the people.

(Key Informant Interview, 06 September 2021. Pretoria, South Africa).

Thus, following the adoption of a new Constitution in 1961 with the country changing name from the Union to the Republic of South Africa the country was set on a *path of separate development* characterised by racially segregated social and economic policies that effectively divided the country into four major racial groups comprising black Africans, Coloureds, Indians and minority whites (Mariotti 2009: 2; Msimang 2000, cited in Quanson 2014: 5; Jordaan and Ukpere 2011: 1095; Budeli et al. 2008: 31; Jisheng 1987: 19). To give effect to its racial ideology of segregation and '*separate development*,' the discriminatory effects of the 1913 Natives Land Act and the 1923 Native Urban Areas Act were intensified through the promulgation of the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1976 that designated 10 small areas as homelands for black Africans, known in South Africa as the infamous Bantustans categorised by their ethnicity (see Appendix 1; also, Butler et al. 1978; Phiri 2020: 27). The overt objective was to deny black South Africans citizenship in White South Africa³, but make them citizens of their designated Bantustans (Butler et al. 1978; Klaveren et al. 2009: 5). While leaving a legacy characterised by politicisation of ethnic identity, Bantustans ceased to exist on 27 April 1994, the date on which the Bantustans and their citizens were re-admitted into South Africa and thus incorporated into the present-day nine provinces (Butler et al. 1978).

One of the apartheid government's notable achievements was in the area of Afrikaner education and training. While the majority Afrikaner white workers were just as poorly educated as the black African workers as apartheid intensified in the 1950s, the National Party's⁴ deliberate and conscious educational policies promoted a rapid improvement in the educational attainment for Afrikaners resulting in its convergence with the education level of English-speaking workers in less than two decades (Mariotti 2009: 13). Alongside the marginalisation of black African education in the Bantustans, the promulgation of the Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 saw not only the establishment of the Native Education Department but also the creation of a syllabus structured to provide an education for black Africans sufficient only to serve their own people in the homelands or work in positions under white employers (Naidoo et al. 2014: 2; Jordaan and Ukpere 2011: 1095; Gradin 2019: 554; Adam 2020: 3). The Act also aimed to ensure that black Africans did not pursue any further education opportunities (Adams 2020: 3). Subsequently, other education legislation was enacted for different racial groups, namely, the Coloured Persons Education Act of 1963, the Indians Education Act 61 of 1965.

³ A term that was consistently used during apartheid.

⁴ Afrikaner worker-supported party that took power from the Smuts government in 1948 and began implementing grand apartheid.

While the educational attainment of the two white population groups converged, the gap between white and black education widened dramatically as a result of the oppressive stagnation and suppression of black education by the apartheid racist regime, with less than a fifth of black students attaining high school education (Mariotti 2009: 13). Making a comparison of white and black education at age 16, Mariotti (2009) observed stark disparities in educational outcomes between the two racial groups. While 87.7 percent of black Africans aged 16 had some form of primary education (0-7 years of schooling) by 1970, two-thirds of this cohort were without primary education. Contrastingly, the percentage for the Afrikaners and English-speaking whites without primary education were 7.6 percent and 2.49 percent, respectively (Mariotti 2009: 18). At matriculation level (at least 5 years of high school education), the proportions were 0.38 percent for black Africans, 18.9 percent and 30.9 percent for Afrikaners and English-speaking whites, respectively (Mariotti 2009: 18). This was in addition to differential pay scales for teachers in black and white schools as well as the apartheid education policy resulting in gross inequalities in public funding between white and black schools that ensured low-quality facilities for black Africans (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 39; Burger and Jafta 2010b: 3; Dass and Rinquest 2017: 143). Apart from having white schools serving white neighbourhoods and black schools in black neighbourhoods, state funding was allocated on a racial sliding scale with black schools receiving the lowest state funding of R146 per child; followed by Coloured schools at R498 per child, Indian schools R771 per child and white schools receiving the largest share of R1,211 per child (Dass and Rinquest 2017: 143). Thus, using education as an instrument for oppression, the best education was offered to white children, followed by Indians, then Coloureds, with black Africans receiving the lowest quality education (Adams 2020: 3).

The deliberate and conscious design of apartheid education policy to produce specific outcomes in the labour market was apparent. This racial education system meant not only to ensure an uninterrupted supply of skilled white workers but also that black Africans and poorly educated whites were not clear substitutes in the labour market (Naidoo et al. 2014: 2; Mariotti 2009: 2). The implicit objective was to preclude black competition with poorly educated whites for low-skilled and semi-skilled jobs in the manufacturing sector (Gradin 2019: 554; Mariotti 2009: 6). This was in addition to a series of apartheid laws specifically targeting the labour market, which could analytically be divided into the 1948-1976 period and the 1977-1993 period (Budeli et al. 2008: 28; Burger and Jafta 2011b: 3; Mariotti 2009). The first period saw the consolidation of exclusionary policies aimed at institutionalising and giving force to the ideology of racial separation within the labour market (Budeli et al. 2008: 28). When the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 repealed its predecessor Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, it introduced several labour market practices meant to produce a racially exclusive industrial labour market system that favoured the dominant minority

white population (Gradin 2019: 554). First and foremost was the policy of job reservation that allowed the government to declare certain occupations as reserved for a particular social group—a system of racial allocation of jobs to whites and dependent on the supply of white workers (Mariotti 2009: 6; Naidoo et al. 2014: 2). Job reservation effectively excluded blacks from occupations that attracted large numbers of whites, thus forming what can be effectively called ‘labour market apartheid’ that saw a racial allocation of low-skilled and low-paying jobs to non-whites and high-skilled, high-paying jobs to whites (Mariotti 2009: 5; Klaveren et al. 2009: 8; Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 11). Furthermore, black Africans continued to be excluded from the definition of an ‘employee’, which the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 defined as,

“Any person other than black, employed by or working for, an employer and receiving or being entitled to receive any remuneration and any other person whatsoever, other than black, who in any manner assists in the caring or conducting of the business of the employer” (Jordaan and Ukpere 2011: 1094; Budeli and Kalula 2008: 30; Mariotti 2009: 12).

The racial exclusion of blacks from the definition of a ‘employee’ had the implicit objective of proscribing the unionisation of black African workers (Gradin 2019: 554; Naidoo et al. 2014: 2; Budeli et al. 2008: 29; Mariotti 2009: 5; Klaveren et al. 2009: 8; Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 11; Gradin 2019: 554). The successful deployment of education and labour market reforms as social policy instruments to address the ‘poor white unemployment problem,’ saw less than 12.5 percent of black Africans formally employed in 1970 despite constituting 70 percent of the total population (Mariotti 2009: 14).

The second era (1977-1993) saw the desegregation of the labour market as a result of several factors including secured labour market position of skilled white workers from black competition and improved educational attainment of whites (Mariotti 2008: 2). With The upward mobility of whites towards highly skilled jobs resulted in increased employment of black Africans in semi-skilled jobs from the late 1970s (Mariotti 2008: 2). Consequently, black employment responded positively, rising to 27.7 percent in 1985, a change attributed to the desegregation not of the whole labour market but specifically of semi-skilled occupations (Mariotti 2009: 14; see also Budeli et al. 2008: 27).

A gendered analysis of apartheid labour markets reveals a persistent alienation of women from the labour market as they faced multi-faceted discrimination in the workplace (Quanson 2014: 1). While a few white women were employed in the formal sector, particularly in administrative positions, an intersectionality of gender and race resulted in black women segregated to domestic and menial employment as cleaners and tea ladies without any education relative to their white counterparts, a phenomenon that persists to date (Sinden

2017: 37; Msimang 2000, cited in Quanson 2014: 5). As expressed in the words of one key informant:

“The colonial and apartheid welfare system were underpinned by racist, patriarchal and paternalistic values that were discriminatory on the grounds of race, class and sex”
(Key Informant Interview, 24 August 2021, Durban, South Africa).

A strong patriarchal culture permeated social policy development from the colonial through the apartheid period. As argued by Quanson (2014), laws in South Africa never provided protection for women as the country was very patriarchal, with women considered subordinate to men in status and relegated to the private sphere with power disparities reflected in gender inequitable distribution of resources, information and income (Msimang 2000, cited in Quanson 2014: 5). This was in addition to race being established and legitimised as a dominant factor in shaping social policies, an intersectionality that put female black Africans at a greater disadvantage (Bond and Malikane 2019: 13; Jordaan and Ukpere 2011: 1095). The historical overview above leads to a presentation of the methods and materials used in this research.

2.0 METHODS AND MATERIALS

A combination of desk study and collection of primary – particularly qualitative – data was used in answering the research questions that guided the study. The desk study, which preceded the primary qualitative data gathering, involved extensive document analysis. The documents included government policy documents, government publications, national constitutions, commission reports, and party manifestos from the colonial to the post-apartheid period. These documents provided rich information that helped to understand the ideological underpinnings of social policies across the periods of the history of South Africa. The documents also included annual reports/publications of key statutory bodies established to monitor particular social policy trends in South Africa and to advise ministers accordingly.

In this regard, a key source of secondary data, particularly for analysing transformational change in the South African labour market, including gender transformation, was the 20th Commission for Employment Equity (CEE) Annual Report 2019/20. This secondary data source provided a good fit as it outlined the state of the South African labour market immediately before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The report provided labour market data disaggregated by race (Africans, Coloureds, Indians and Whites) and gender across six different occupational levels thus providing a holistic picture of the labour

market. The three gender labour market variables analysed included the gender employment gap, gender pay/wage gap and gender occupational segregation and stratification.

While no primary quantitative data were produced, the primary data-gathering component of the study comprised mainly key informant interviews with key social policy experts and government officials purposely selected to provide a rich corpus of primary qualitative data. While the participants were drawn from different social policy areas such as health, and social protection, some were selected on the basis of having academic experience as well as experience of working in the government in the area of social policy. At all times, a gender focus was maintained in framing the research questions.

A total of 10 key informant interviews were planned, however, due to time constraints and commitments, six key informant interviews were conducted. While an interview with the Minister of the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development was secured but later postponed to a date after submission of this report, connections were established between GETSPA researcher and the Department. However, the researcher was privileged to interview the chairperson of the Commission for Employment Equity, a statutory body, located within the Department of Labour. It was established in connection with section 28 of the Employment Equity Act (EEA) to monitor transformation in the South African labour market and provide policy advice to the minister. For constituency-building purposes, connections between the GETSPA research project and the Commission were already established.

While no primary quantitative data were gathered, the data from secondary sources were descriptively analysed to produce distributional percentages while deductive thematic analysis was used to analyse qualitative data gathered from the key informant interviews (Braun and Clarke 2006). The process involved cleaning, transcription, coding and thematic grouping. For ethical purposes, a specific form was used to secure informed consent from prospective participants.

3.0 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: TRANSFORMATIVE SOCIAL POLICY (TSP)

It is useful to set some conceptual definitions of terms consistently used in the report. Gender equality, a term carrying transformative connotations, refers to a “situation where men and women, boys and girls enjoy the same rights, resources, opportunities and protections” in all spheres of life (de Austria 2014: 1; SIDA 2016: 1; Manuals for Trainers Gender Equality and Gender Mainstreaming 2014: 12; see also SIDA 2016: 1; USAID 2008). USAID (2008) stresses that gender equality seeks to remove all forms of systemic

social exclusion and discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, race, sex, language, economic status and all other social identities (USAID 2008: 1; see also de Austria 2014: 1).

Quite distinct, but providing preconditions for gender equality, is the concept of gender equity, a term that refers to “justice and fairness in the treatment of women and men, boys and girls in order to eventually achieve gender equality and often requesting differential treatment of women and men, boys and girls to compensate for the historical and social disadvantages that prevent women and men from sharing a level playing field” (Manual for Trainers Gender Equality and Gender Mainstreaming 2014: 12; ABC of Women Workers’ Rights and Gender Equality 2000, cited in de Austria 2014: 1). This entails continuously and proactively addressing historical inequalities between women and men to achieve gender equality (Manual for Trainers Gender Equality and Gender Mainstreaming 2014: 13).

Social policy, as conceptualised within the Transformative Social Policy (TSP) framework, refers to “collective interventions in the economy to influence access to and the incidence of adequate and secure livelihood and income” or “collective public efforts aimed at affecting and protecting the wellbeing of people in a given location” (Mkandawire 2004: 1; Adesina 2009: 38). The TSP framework is a policy autonomy project seeking to reject the hegemonic framing of social policy exemplified in Western social policy instruments. While it invites fidelity to a broader, more expansive vision of social policy, within Africa it advocates social policy making from an African standpoint (Adesina 2020). It represents an attempt to shift the balance of power in policy making from the North to the South. Infused with a feminist project, it seeks to transform the hegemonic ‘male stream’ patriarchal policy making that has relentlessly sought to preserve and institutionalise the subordinate position of women in society (Jackson and van Vlaenderen 1994: 3; Quanson 2014: 1). Below is a representation of the norms, functions and instruments of the TSP framework. The transformative approach to social policy has its origins in the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) flagship research programme, Social Policy in a Development Context (2000-2006), that covered East Asian, Latin American and African countries (see UNRISD 2006; Mkandawire 2001; Adesina 2009).




Fig. 1: Transformative Social Policy: Norms, Functions, Instruments and Outcomes

Source: Adesina, 2011: 463

Foremost, as presented in the TSP framework, are the ideational and normative underpinnings of social policies, which are critical in understanding the kind of social policies that may evolve in any given context (Beland 2009: 561). Such an understanding becomes vital in comparative analysis of social policies within a specific country or across countries (Braun and Capano 2010:1). The TSP is underpinned by normative principles of solidarity and equality, but the existence of social policies framed by racist, separatist and discriminatory (usually patriarchal) ideologies and the theories of the second sex cannot be ruled out (Bond 2014: 6; Naidoo et al. 2014: 2; Klaveren et al. 2009: 8; Gradin 2019: 554; Quanson 2014: 1). Using the apartheid system as an illustration of the latter, one key informant had this to say:

The racist motive or driving force was a highly racist framework. It is what you may refer to as the 'dark' side of social policy because it was premised on the demonization of the humanity of the Africans, Coloureds and Asians. This is what we may call the 'negative' deployment of social policy.

Key Informant Interview, 6 September 202, Pretoria, South Africa.

Other ideological underpinnings with negative implications for women include liberalism, which regards family and the markets as lying outside the realm of state action, thus producing social policies averse to the collectivisation of care responsibilities (Hassim 2004: 3).

Neoliberalism, an updated version of classical, liberal economic thought, represents a body of economic theory and policy associated with a minimalist state narrowly focusing on defining property rights, enforcing contracts, and regulating money supply (Kotz and Hall 2000: 1). Its policy recommendations, with disastrous gender implications, are concerned mainly with dismantling the welfare state, deregulation of business; privatisation of public entities; cuts in social spending; and tax reductions for business and investment (Kotz and Hall 2000: 1). Neoliberalism tends to elevate the role of markets and families vis-à-vis the state in social reproduction with negative implications for gender equality. A Marxist feminist approach links quite closely with the social reproduction functions within the TSP framework, concerned with the “reconciliation of the burdens of social reproduction with that of other social tasks” to share this burden of responsibility to achieve gender equality (Mkandawire 2011). Using a Marxist feminist perspective, the TSP framework seeks to interrogate conditions for social reproduction and their gendered implications (UNRISD 2010). These ought to remain key targets of transformative social policy for the attainment of gender equality.

Stressing the importance of institutional cultures, the TSP approach argues that what ultimately emerge as social or economic policies are products of the sociological construction of social problems deeply embedded in the dominant cultural assumptions, value and belief systems of a given society (Beland 2009: 567). These relate to the norms, values and beliefs systems of any given society, with the latter defined as the shared set of normative and principled beliefs of the concerned people (Braun and Capano 2010: 4). Values are embedded in the culture of societies and define, in a given context, what is important, meaningful, desirable and worthwhile, thus providing directions to guide people’s actions (Corvellec and Risburg 2010, cited in Corvellec and Hultman 2014: 357; Corvellec and Hultman 2014: 358). This is particularly important in contexts with a history of diverse cultures and values such as that of South Africa (Jordaan and Ukpere 2011: 1093). However, changes in the political context may be concomitant with changes from one regime of values to another as values are not absolute but locally determined across time and space by social groups that have different vantage points (Corvellec and Hultman 2014: 359; Rein 1973).

The latter is particularly important from a feminist perspective as values emerge from relationships among people who are different and therefore of unequal social status, acting

within a specific social order (Corvellec and Hultman 2014: 360). Thus, valuation – the processes of assigning value in policy making – is political as it involves “relations, assumptions and contestations pertaining to power” (Corvellec and Hultman 2014: 360). Thus, the role of institutional cultures, particularly the unexamined cultural assumptions regarding women and the family, which tend to influence the design and selection of social and economic policies and the construction of welfare regimes, need to be objects of transformative social policies (Beland 2009: 258).

Rejecting the hegemonic mono-protection tasking of social policy exemplified in the dominant Western social policy instruments, the TPS framework is an invitation to a multi-tasking of social policy comprising production, redistribution, protection, reproduction social cohesion and nation building (Mkandawire 2004, cited in Yi 2015; Adesina 2011: 463). The weighting placed on each of these multiple tasks of social policy varies contextually and from time to time (Mkandawire 2004). In many countries of the global South, external donor influence and interference have resulted in the elevation of an “impoverished” social protection function of social policy exemplified in the proliferation of mainly donor-funded cash transfer programmes (Adesina 2021: 6).

The gendered effect of such a neoliberal approach to social policy is the neglect of the social reproductive function of social policy thus exacerbating gendered inequalities (Sinden 2017: 42). The utility of the TSP as an approach to social policy in a development context lies in its multiple social policy instruments rather than the preference for “cash” characteristic of the dominant social protection paradigm (Adesina 2011: 454). Among these is land and agrarian reform, critical in making social policies catalyse and support agrarian transitions and structural transformation in informal, non-industrialised economies.

Other equally important social policy instruments for equitable gender transformation selected in this study include education, labour market reforms (work and employment), health sector reforms and social insurance as assistance programmes. Within the TSP approach, investment in improved health and education extends to labour market outcomes and ought to be seen not as expenditures but investments as they enhance the productive potential of individuals, communities and economies (Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, cited in Gumede 2020: 503). Transformative social policy entails the inseparability of and holding in tandem of economic and social policies, addressing the adverse effects of growth and mitigating risks emanating from changing life-cycle circumstances and social reproductive burdens (UNRISD 2010).

4.0 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

With the formal end of political apartheid in 1993 following three and half centuries of colonialism, there was an imperative need for transformation in general and gender equity in particular in all spheres of life education, work and employment, health, social insurance and assistance, land and agrarian reform (Quanson 2014: 2). Marking the post-apartheid period, in 1994 the new black majority South African government, after inheriting a society deeply divided along racial, class, gender and geographical lines entrenched over a period of over 350 years, faced the colossal and multiple tasks of halting, dismantling, reversing and transforming South African society towards one based on principles of equality, non-racialism and non-sexism (Gradin 2019: 554; Quanson 2014: 5; Jordaan and Ukperere 2011: 1095; Budeli et al. 2008: 68; Ferreira 2005: 197).

Underpinned by a liberal ideology of equal rights, the new post-apartheid government set on an ambitious path to transform the society for “the better of all” who live in South Africa (Armstrong and Burger 2009: 1). Whether the new government’s liberal ideology that shaped social policy making during this period succeeded or not forms the core of the discussion in this report. This section, which focuses on the post-apartheid period, is structured along the five social policy instruments adopted for this study, namely education and training, work and employment, social assistance, health care and, lastly, land and agrarian reform. In each social policy sector, the legislative measures taken by the post-independence government are first outlined, followed by a discussion of the policy outcomes emanating from the intersectionality of gender with other axes of race, class and geography.

4.1 Education and Skills Training

Section 29(1)(a) of the democratic Constitution of South Africa guaranteeing access to basic education is regarded as lying at the heart of the country’s transition to a sustainable, non-racist and non-sexist society (Naidoo et al. 2014: 9; Maziya, Sparreboom, Hertz, Ali-bor, de Jager and Nakanyane 2003: 28; Quanson 2014: 5; Adams 2020: 4; Dass and Rinquest 2017: 143). Towards the realisation of this goal, the new government set on an ambitious journey to transform the racially segregated education system entrenched over many decades (Adams 2020: 3; Matola and Yusuf 2009: 1; Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 7).

The measures taken included revising the entire education curriculum, integrating all education and training through the creation of the single National Qualifications Framework (NQF), merging and closing universities and colleges to transform the higher education system and integrating all teacher education training institutions in addition to introducing a pre-primary (Grade 0) year for all learners (Matola and Yusuf 2009: 1). However, in pre-tertiary education, the South African Education Act (SASA) of 1996 remains the country’s

key reference point for post-independence legislation in the education sector (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 7; Dass and Rinquest 2017: 145).

In an attempt to achieve fiscal parity in education to promote equity and redress the colonial and apartheid legacies of racially discriminatory apartheid state funding, an important amendment to the SASA of 1996 introduced the No Fee Schools Policy (NFSP) that took effect from 1 January 2007 (Matola and Yusuf 2009: 1). According to the NFSP, parents with learners in schools designated as ‘no-fee schools’ (Quintiles 1-3) do not have to pay school fees for their children as the latter would be funded through the fiscus (Dass and Rinquest 2017: 143). Through a quintile funding system, the government channels a greater proportion of educational financial resources towards the historically disadvantaged schools in quintile 1-3 at a rate of R1,177 per learner (Dass and Rinquest 2017: 143). Suggesting continuity of the apartheid sliding scale but in reverse order, the amount of government funding decreases as the quintile increases, with quintile 4 schools funded at a rate of R590 while the highest quintile is funded at a rate of R274 per learner (Dass and Rinquest 2017: 143).

While 40 percent of all schools in South Africa were initially declared ‘no fee schools,’ the percentage rose to 60 percent in 2011 (Yusuf and Shireen 2012: 1; Matola and Yusuf 2009: 4). Despite the introduction of NFSP, education in the country remains characterised by a two-tier system comprising privileged and well-resourced schools for mainly white and Indian children alongside poor and disadvantaged schools catering for black and Coloured children (Yusuf and Shireen 2012: 1; Matola and Yusuf 2009: 4). Spatially, many of the ‘no fee schools’ are located predominantly in the poorest provinces of the Eastern Cape with over 56 percent of learners in the poorest quintile 1 and 2 ‘no fee schools’ compared with only 14.5 percent and 21.9 percent in the higher-income provinces of Western Cape and Gauteng respectively (Matola and Yusuf 2009: 3). This has tended to reinforce spatial inequalities in addition to exacerbating the race and class divide in the country. Despite public education typically taking up to 15 percent of South Africa’s annual national budget, education policies adopted appear to cement rather than reduce racial inequality (Bond and Malikane 2019: 12). Equitable access to quality education remains elusive for the majority of learners in South Africa despite three-fifths of all schools designated as ‘no fee schools’, a point stressed by one key informant in an interview:

South Africa represents what Richard Titmuss described long back. Social policies specifically designed for the poor produces poor outcomes. Those delivering the service know very well that the parents of children who go to ‘no fee schools’ are poor people and tend to produce poor service precisely because there is no fear of blowback.

Key Informant Interview, 6 September 2021, Pretoria, South Africa

White learners remain likely to live in urban areas and in proximity to well-resourced schools located within white neighbourhoods, a product of the apartheid Group Areas Act of 1950 which established racial urban rezoning. This can be contrasted to the majority of black African learners likely to live in rural areas and townships in close proximity to historically disadvantaged black schools (Burger and Jafta 2010a: 16; Republic of South Africa 2019: 49). As a result, large differences in the quality of education between mainly white schools and mainly black schools have notoriously persisted, feeding racial, class and gender inequalities (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 39).

It can safely be argued that educational policies of the post-independence government in South Africa have failed to universalise quality education despite channeling huge state resources towards historically black schools (Maziya et al. 2003: 28; Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 39). Additionally, the removal of racial pay scales has failed to enhance the quality of education offered in historically black schools as differences in the quality of teachers between urban and affluent suburban schools and historically black and rural schools persist (Maziya et al. 2003: 18; van de Burg 2001: 8, cited in Burger and Jafta 2010b: 3).

As a result, the majority of learners in the former Bantustans face insurmountable difficulties in obtaining a school-leaving certificate due to the inadequate preparation characteristic of many poor schools in South Africa (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 39). Over 70 percent of students passing Grade 12 are denied entry to university due to failure to attain the certificate with endorsement critical for undergraduate enrolment, with female students likely to be affected the most due to cultural norms and the burden of social reproductive work (Maziya et al. 2003: 18; Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 39).

The cohort failing to sit the sole externally examined Grade 12 examination exhibits varying levels of education depending on the quality of primary and/or secondary school attended, thus feeding into racial, class and gender inequalities in the labour market (Burger and Jafta 2010a: 16; Gradin 2019: 555; Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 39). Despite, tertiary education policy providing many incentives and support for black students, their poor-quality primary and high-school education effectively excludes them from attaining the university education critical for success in the labour market (Maziya et al. 2003: 28; Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 44).

This is in addition to large differences in the average years of schooling between blacks and whites, which are a product of self-defeating and contradictory educational policies (Gradin 2019: 555). The enforcement of maximum age limits for each grade stipulated in the SASA of 1996 has produced contradictory outcomes characterised by increased

educational attainment by the youth but with insignificant improvement in the average years of schooling (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 7). While the previous policy had allowed retention of learners within the school system, the post-1996 period witnessed large numbers of youth older than the norm for their grade churned out of the school system to enter into the labour market, joining those failing to complete their secondary schooling and feeding into youth unemployment in the country (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 7).

4.1.1 COVID-19 and Online Learning in South Africa

The outbreak of the COVID-19 and the closure of schools exposed the persistent inequalities in access to quality education (Parker, Morris and Hofmeyr 2020: 1). The majority of learners, predominantly black, attended public schools characterised by overcrowding and poor infrastructure, particularly the computer facilities that would prove crucial in facilitating the transition to online learning (Dube 2020: 135; Parker et al. 2020: 9). The COVID-19 imperative to transit from face-to-face to online learning magnified pre-existing social and educational inequalities. Only 10.4 percent of South African households have access to the internet, with a substantially lower proportion in rural provinces. where households with access to internet in the remote Limpopo province, for example, the proportion of households with access is as low as 1.7 percent (Pillay 2020: 5; Parker et al. 2020: 9; Dube 2020: 135).

At the other extreme, adequately resourced and funded schools with functional education facilities and attended by predominantly white and Indian children transitioned smoothly to online remote learning. As a result, many black and coloured children attending poorly resourced and underfunded schools, were excluded from remote online learning (Pillay 2020: 3; Dube 2020: 135). An intersectionality of gender, race and class would reveal that children living in low-income female households would bear the brunt (Pillay 2020: 3). Thus, one effect of the pandemic was to reinforce the bi-modal schooling system in the country, as highlighted during key informant interviews

The stratification of South Africa's education system into private, model C, township and 'no fee schools' implies that private schools were able to transit to online learning with the COVID-19 impact on education severely affecting low income households, particularly those headed by African females.

Key Informant Interview, 6 September 2021, Pretoria, South Africa

These differences tend to fuel differences in labour market outcomes between black, Coloureds, Indians and whites as the level of returns to education increases with increasing quality of education (Maziya et al. 2003: 9; Burger and Jafta 2010b: 3). Access to quality

education remains an important, gendered, pre-labour market discriminatory factor that is likely to become more significant post-COVID-19.

4.2 Work and Employment

One of the legacies inherited by the new post-apartheid government in 1994 was a deeply divided and segregated labour market where outcomes were differentiated along racial, class and gendered lines (Mariotti 2009). With many individuals and households dependent on the labour market for their income and welfare, its transformation to eliminate racial and gender discrimination to comply with equity provisions in the Constitution was one of the priority goals of the post-independence government (Gumede 2020: 9; Ferreira 2005: 197; Sinden 2017: 37; Gradin 2019: 554; Naidoo et al. 2014: 2; Burger and Jafta 2010a: 4; Budeli and Kalula 2008: 70). Post-independence, four key labour market laws were enacted to redress imbalances, particularly to achieve equity in employment, eliminate unfair discrimination in the workplace and promote equal opportunity in the labour market (Sinden 2017: 37; Quanson 2014: 5; Jordaan and Ukpere 2011: 1093). From a gender perspective, the legislation aimed at creating a platform and environment for gender equality within the workplace (Sinden 2017: 42).

4.2.1 *The Employment Equity Act (EEA) 55 of 1998*

The EEA 55 of 1998 is a product of the Presidential Labour Market Commission set up in 1995 to investigate and make recommendations towards the elimination of all forms of discrimination in the labour market (Burger and Jafta 2010a: 4). The Act designated particular racial groups as underrepresented in certain categories of work and mandates employers proactively to attract, develop and retain individuals from previously disadvantaged groups (Jordaan and Ukpere 2011: 1095; Ferreira 2005: 203; Quanson 2014: 2;). Recognising the pronounced disparities created by apartheid, the designated groups specified in the Act includes blacks Coloureds, and Indians, women and people with disabilities (Burger and Jafta 2010a: 5; Klaveren et al. 2009: 21). Its explicit objective was to redress past inequalities in jobs, income and occupation that could not be eliminated simply by repealing apartheid legislation (Jordaan and Ukpere 2011: 1095; Burger and Jafta 2010a: 4; Budeli et al. 2008: 69; Ferreira 2005: 203; Quanson 2014: 2; Klaveren et al. 2009: 21). Additionally, the Act made provisions for the creation of the Commission for Employment Equity (CEE), a statutory body within the Department of Labour mandated to compile and report progress with respect to employment equity (Burger and Jafta 2010a: 5). As indicated during an interview, an additional clause on “equal pay for work of equal value” was added to address issues of gender pay gaps following amendments of the EEA of 1998 (*Key informant interview, 2 September 2021 Pretoria, South Africa*).

4.2.2 Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of 1995

The Act was promulgated to change the labour laws in South Africa and give effect to Section 23 of the Constitution, which regulates organisational rights of trade unions, promoting and facilitating collective bargaining processes at the workplace and the establishment of workplace forums (Subramanien and Joseph 2019: 2).

4.2.3 Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) 75 of 1997

The BCEA 75 of 1997 was passed to regulate conditions of employment to ensure that all workers have some basic rights. Included were those, predominantly women, working in vulnerable activities and sectors such as contract cleaning, domestic work, agriculture and wholesale (Sinden 2017: 37; Maziya et al. 2003: 8; Budeli et al. 2008: 69; Ferreira 2005: 202). These basic conditions of employment include the regulation of work hours, right to take leave, remuneration and termination of employment (BCEA 1991: 1).

4.2.4 Skills Development Act (SDA) of 1998

The SDA of 1998 made provision for the creation of the Skills Development Levies Act (SDLA) of 1999 and a National Skills Authority (NSA) was established to advise the minister on national skills development (Ferreira 2005: 204; Budeli et al. 2008: 69; Klaveren et al. 2009: 21). This was in addition to setting up Sectoral Education Training Authorities (SETAs) responsible for skills training in various sectors of the economy as stipulated in the Act (Sinden 2017: 37; Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 42). The SDLA of 1999 makes it mandatory for the NSA to levy all employers to create a skills development fund for skills training (Maziya et al. 2003: 6).

4.2.5 Other post-Independence Labour Market Regulations

In addition to the four primary laws above, the Promotion of Equality and the Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act and the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BBEE) Act were promulgated as complements to the EEA of 1998 and the LRA of 1995 (Burger and Jafta 2010a: 5). More germane in the era of COVID-19 is the Unemployment Insurance Act (the UIA) 2001 and Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act, 2002 (the UIC Act), administered through the Department of Labour, which saw the establishment of the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 4). Employers are obliged pay a total contribution of 2 percent towards the UIF, half of which is contributed by the employee. UIF provides short-term unemployment insurance in the event of maternity, illness or death of a contributor (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 4).

4.2.6 Labour Market Outcomes

The ensuing discussion examines the impact of the above post-Independence labour market legislation on three important labour market outcomes germane to women namely, the

gender employment gap, the gender pay gap and lastly gender occupational segregation and stratification, which all represent some form of labour market discrimination. The discussion draws heavily on the 20th Commission for Employment Equity (CEE) Annual Report 2019/2020 as it gives a reflection of women's position in South Africa's labour market at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

4.2.7 Gender Employment Gap

According to the last national census (2011) women constitutes 50.6 percent of South Africa's population (Statistics South Africa 2011). The 20th CCE Annual Report reveals that 45.4 percent of females in South Africa are within the economically active population (EAP) relative to 54.6 percent of males (CEE 2020: 9). Adopting the Burger and Jafta (2010a) definition, gender employment gap refers to male/female differentials in employment (Burger and Jafta 2010a: 18). Thus, gender inequality exists if the distribution of females and males deviates in some characteristic – such as employment/labour market participation – from their ratio in the population (Dorins and Firebaugh 2010, cited in Sinden 2017: 39).

Female labour force participation (FLFP) in South Africa shows a rising trend from the lowest level of participation when women accounted for only 23 percent of the labour force in 1960, to 32 percent in the 1970s further increasing to 34 percent in 1995 (South Africa-Towards Inclusive Economic Development (SA-TIED) 2019: 2; Klaveren et al. 2009: 15). In the early 2000s FLFP stabilised at 40 percent, or 44 percent if domestic workers are included (Klaveren et al. 2009: 15). Between 2014 and 2018 FLFP hovered above 45 percent, closing at 48.9 percent in 2018 (SA-TIED 2019: 2). Thus, South Africa may represent one of the leading countries on the continent in relation to FLFP and an important case to analyse regarding the extent to which the labour market can be a source for gender economic equality and welfare for African women.

Despite the great strides made by women in labour force participation in South Africa, this has not been without its set of racial and gendered inflexions. An intersectionality of race and gender reveals that while the gender employment gap is almost negligible among the whites, among the black African population, women were 15 percent less likely to find work than their male counterparts (Burger and Jafta 2010a: 20). While the differences in skill sets between an average black females and males can be acknowledged, African women face higher hurdles to cross before finding work and those who are working are a more select group out of the total population (Klaveren et al. 2009: 4; Burger and Jafta 2010a: 23). As highlighted in an interview with the Chairperson of the Commission for Employment Equity:

The closing gender employment gap obscures more than it reveals. The relatively high FLFP comes at a cost for women, as the South African patriarchal labour market is insensitive to the other needs of women. Women need to go to maternity but what we find is that employers are not sensitive to the dynamics of maternity leave and what happens during maternity leave.

(Key informant interview, 2 September 2021, Pretoria, South Africa)

Marxist feminist social reproductive theory seeks to illuminate labour market participation constraints faced by women that force them to exit the labour market due to pregnancy, caregiving and homemaking responsibilities, aspects that mainstream labour market economists are yet to recognise (Sinden 2017: 42; Leibbrandt 2010: 7; Phiri 2020: 44; Tekwa and Adesina 2018: 58). Gender-sensitive employment policies need to ensure that women enter the labour market on an equal footing, taking cognisance of their social reproductive roles for gender equitable and transformational labour markets (Sinden 2017: 38).

4.2.8 Gender Wage Gap

Gender wage gap refer to differentials in the average hourly pay of men and women at the same occupational level (Brynin 2017: 7). It is an important indicator of equality, fairness and equity not only in the labour market but also in society at large (Bosch 2020: 6). Where women earn less than men leads to differentials in the accumulation of wealth, individual and family welfare and conditions in old age, thus exacerbating gender inequality (Bosch 2020: 6). While South Africa had made considerable progress in narrowing the gender wage gap from 40 percent in 1993 (SA-TIIED 2019: 2), according to the *Business Insider*, in 2019 the gender wage gap remains stubbornly high at an average of 25 percent (de Villiers 2019). Thus, women in South Africa are still paid considerably less than their male counterparts at the same occupational level. In the healthcare sector men are paid 28.1 percent more than women, 25.1 percent more in the media and general retail services and 21.8 percent more in the financial sector (de Villiers 2019).

In line with the 20th CEE Annual Report, a research brief by the SA-TIIED revealed that the gender wage gap is highest among top-level earners, suggesting that women in South Africa rarely occupy top positions in the labour market (SA-TIIED 2019: 1). The *Business Insider* reveals that the gender pay gap between female and male top earners in the South African labour market is as wide as 39 percent, highlighting the prevalence of gender occupational segregation and stratification (de Villiers 2019). Thus, SA-TIIED (2019) described the South African labour market as characterised by a “‘sticky floor effect,’ a pattern that keeps a certain group at the bottom of the job scale”, predominantly occupied by females, particularly black African (SA-TIIED 2019: 1). Commenting on factors underlying the persistently high gender wage gap, the Chairperson for the Commission for Employment Equity remarked:

South Africa by its very nature is a patriarchal society that rates males higher, with women regarded as second-class citizens. That norm had sort of penetrated the labour market, becoming a pattern in which men are paid much better than females and get more opportunities for appointment than females.

Key informant interview, 2 September 2021, Pretoria, South Africa

Feeding into the gender pay gap is the increasing informalisation and casualisation of previously formal jobs in South Africa that came with the implementation of the LRA of 1995, the EEA of 1998 and the SDA of 1998. These led to a rise in casual, part-time and contract work and a significant decline in permanent protected work (Gumede 2020: 13; Klaveren et al. 2009: 18; Maziya et al. 2003: 18; Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 12; Bond 2007: 203). An intersectional analysis reveals that informal employment is predominantly black and female. Black South African women constitute 33.8 percent of those employed in the informal sector relative to only 5.0 percent white females (Wilson 2021). The lower wages associated with the sector feeds into the black gender wage gap (Klaveren et al. 2009: 16; Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 16). Generally wages in the South African informal sector were found to be 3.5 times lower at US\$203/month compared with US\$715/month in the formal economy, thus reinforcing the gender pay gap (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 16; Klaveren et al. 2009: 16).

4.2.9 Gender Occupational Segregation and Stratification

Occupational segregation is a structural characteristic of the labour market in which one population group is over- or underrepresented across different types of jobs and occupations (Washington Centre for Equitable Growth 2017: 1). Intersecting with race and gender, occupational segregation is often seen as a key driver of gender wage gaps (Das and Kotikula 2019: 1). The literature identifies two forms of occupational segregation –horizontal and vertical – in which the former refers to the concentrations of a particular social/demographic group in different occupations and the latter referring to disparities in position with different statuses within the same occupation (Weeden, Newhart and Gelbgiser 2018: 31; Das and Kotikula 2019: 1).

Targeting gender-based employment segregation beyond FLFP remains critical for gender equity and equality since a focus on FLFP alone may not improve gender equality as women end up concentrating in jobs characterised by low returns (Washington Centre for Equitable Growth 2017: 1; Das and Kotikula 2019: iv). In the South African labour market, the high-skills tier is characterised by tight demand for white males and, to a lesser extent, white females whereas the low-skills tier has an over-supply of African males and females (Gradin 2019: 553; Naidoo et al. 2014: 4; Klaveren et al. 2009: 45).

According to the 20th CEE Annual Report 2019/2020, which traces occupational segregation across six occupational levels, vertical gender-based occupational segregation begins to narrow from the fourth level (skilled level) where the share of males was 55.2 percent and that of females 47.7 percent; semi-skilled 55.2 percent compared with 44.8 percent and lastly 58.5 percent compared with 41.6 percent in the unskilled category (CCE Report 2019/2020). In the higher positions of senior management, the share of males relative to females is as high as 64.7 percent compared with 35.3 percent, rising to 75.6 percent males compared with 24.4 percent for females in top management (CEE Report 2019/2020). The intersectionality of race and gender reveals that only 5.4 percent of African females are in top management compared with 52.4 percent white male representation despite the latter constituting a mere 4.9 percent of the total labour force in South Africa (CEE Report 2019/2020). Thus, despite significant strides in FLFP since independence, occupational segregation persists, with (especially female) blacks systematically segregated into low-skill, low-paying occupations (Gradin 2019: 554; Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 6; Wilson 2021; Sinden 2017: 37; Quanson 2014: 1).

The gender-based discrimination in the South African labour market was exacerbated by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. While the labour market shock resulted in 40 percent net loss in employment, suggesting dramatic and longer-term changes in the labour market structure and unemployment, the gendered effects of COVID-19 were inevitable (Jain, Budlender, Zizzamia and Bassier 2020: 1). The pandemic aggravated labour market inequalities and disproportionately affected women, particularly informal workers and those with lower levels of education in manual, low-level occupations (Jain et al. 2020: 2). As highlighted in an interview with the Chairperson of the Commission for Employment Equity (CEE),

One of the things we know from the research we received is that COVID-19 impacted predominantly women and black women, specifically. To a larger extent, the gains we have made in terms of employment equity, in terms of creating access to jobs we have lost it, it has been reversed. To me that is the biggest loss.

Key informant interview, 2 September 2021, Pretoria, South Africa

With job losses concentrated among low-wage occupations, and particularly in the hospitality, education and health sectors which have the largest concentration of women, black women have been hit hardest by the highest probability of becoming unemployed (Wilson 2020).

4.3 Social Security and Assistance

To signify a significant break away from the racial and exclusionary social security system of the colonial and apartheid period, the post-independence government introduced a very

expansive, ambitious and strongly redistributive social security programme through the social grants system (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 4; Armstrong and Burger 2009: 1). The new government sought to deploy its social security system, particularly state social grants, albeit in a neoliberal framework, to provide income support to poor households to deal with the triple challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality (Kohler and Borat 2020: 3; Samson et al. 2006: 1; Armstrong and Burger 2009: 1).

As a tax-funded, social assistance programme unmatched anywhere on the continent, South Africa's programme comprises a five main state assistance grants and three others, making a total of eight state assistance grants. The five main ones are:

- State Old Age Pension (SOAP)
- Child Support Grant (CSG)
- Care Dependents Grant (CDG)
- Foster Care Grant (FCG)
- Disability Grant (DG)

The other new social grants are:

- Older Persons Grant (OPG, above age 75)
- War Veterans Grant (WVG)
- Grant in Aid.

The SOAP dates back to the Old Age Pensions Act of 1928, introduced by the colonial government to address the "poor white problem". In the 1940s, it was extended by the apartheid government to the African population, with racially differentiated benefits (Armstrong and Burger 2009: 1; Seekings 2006: 3). The CSG changed name from the former State Maintenance Grant (SMG) that targeted white children living in poor white households, largely excluding black children (Phiri 2020: 52; Zembe 2013: 39). The DG was first introduced in 1937 by the colonial government then extended along racial lines (Patel 2015: 364; Samson et al. 2006: 1). The FCG and the CDG were in existence before independence but were available only to a small section of the white population (Armstrong and Burger 2009: 1). The neoliberal targeting, income-based means test and exclusive focus on the "deserving" poor is reminiscent of the colonial and apartheid social policies (Phiri 2020: 8; Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 37; Samson et al. 2006: 1).

Despite covering 18 million people, almost a third of the total population and accounting for 3.5 percent of GDP, some gaps still exist within South Africa's social assistance programme (Bhorat and Kohler 2020: 3). The first relates to an inequality reinforcing two-tier

social security system consisting of one group with connections to the labour market and dependent on an employment-based social insurance system, the other group being the vast majority of poor households, particularly females with no links to the labour market and dependent largely on state-provided social assistance (Phiri 2020: 51; Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 22). This had led to heavy dependence on state grants among households situated in the poorest five deciles of income distribution (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 22).

Reinforcing gendered cultural norms, women constitute the vast majority of recipients of the CSG, with only 2.3 percent being male (Kohler and Borat 2020: 4). The pandemic has revealed that in-between the groups are vast numbers of vulnerable households that are neither eligible for state-funded grants nor recipients of employment-based provisions (Phiri 2020: 51). This also relates to the “missing middle”, a demographic group not covered by the state assistance grants targeted on the most vulnerable, namely children, the old and the disabled (Adesina 2020). Social provisioning in South Africa is underpinned by a liberal assumption that “able-bodied” women and men can support themselves through wage work, replicating the colonial and apartheid superstructure (Bhorat and Kohler 2020: 6; Phiri 2020: 51).

From a gender perspective, the emphasis on child poverty exemplified by the CSG has the unintended effect of separating the welfare of children from that of their mothers (Lister 2006: 315). Rather than challenging the gender culture, the CSG seems to reinforce a gendered division of work, as women constitute the majority of recipients (Bhorat and Kohler 2020: 4). Missed by policy makers is the interrelationship between women’s poor labour market position and child poverty and the failure to enable parents (in practice, mothers) to combine paid employment with family responsibilities through social policy (Lister 2006: 315). The child poverty discourse, dominant in South Africa’s social assistance programme, obscures the persistent, gendered nature of care giving (Lister 2006: 315). This stems from the ideological underpinnings of liberalism that regard family and the markets as outside the realm of state action. There is alongside a “cultural value of caring” in the government policy framework that shifts the burden of caring to families – and women in particular – without financial compensation for their time or effective support from the state. This is reminiscent of the colonial and apartheid era (Hassim 2004: 14). Such gaps in the country’s social security system left many vulnerable to the effects of COVID-19.

4.4 Healthcare Provision

Numerous attempts were made to reform the historically divided and discriminatory health care system beginning with the 1994 National Health Policy, the 1997 White Paper for the Transformation of Health Systems and the National Health Act 61 of 2003 (Pauw 2021: 3; Conmy 2018: 1; Burger and Christian 2020: 43). These efforts included the abolition of

user fees, making public health free of charge at the point of use. However, the apartheid dual structure has remained a permanent feature of health care provision in South Africa (Mhlanga 2021: 484; Pauw 2021: 1).

On one hand, there is a high-quality health care system comprising a network of private health care providers operating within a network of private hospitals whose clients are covered mainly by private medical insurance (Conmy 2018: 2). On the other hand, there is poor-quality public health care that is under-resourced and provides very poor service to the majority, mainly black African population (Pauw 2021: 1). Thus, the two-tier healthcare system dichotomy is reinforced. It comprises the insured and the uninsured; the rich and poor; the high quality and expensive health care and the poor-quality, cheap health service; and mainly white or mainly African, private or public health care (Conmy 2018: 3; Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 46; Mhlanga 2021: 484).

While the private health sector caters for a meagre 16 percent of the population, public health care provision features very long queues, shortages of beds, shortages of drugs and medical staff, demonstrating the large disparities in healthcare provision by income (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 46). This is in addition to inequalities in public health funding where 50 percent of total health expenditure goes to the 16 percent of the population covered by private health insurance while the other half is spent on the remaining 84 percent of the population (Phiri 2020: 6). These differences are reflected in disparities in health outcomes between the two major racial groups. The infant mortality rate for white South Africans is 7 per thousand compared with 67 per thousand among black South Africans; the intersectionality of gender and race is reflected in life expectancy, in which the life expectancy for white South African females is 50 percent longer than that of black South African women (Conmy 2018: 4). As highlighted in an interview with a health policy expert:

The inequalities in health care financing and the concomitant racially and gender-differentiated health outcomes led to the introduction of the National Health Insurance, the first universalistic social policy in South Africa.

Key Informant Interview, 25 August 202, Pretoria, South Africa

Thus, in 2009 the ANC government introduced National Health Insurance (NHI) with the intention of transforming the fragmented and unequal health system to provide universal health coverage (UHC) irrespective of race or class (Burger and Christian 2020: 43; Conmy 2018: 1; de Villiers 2021: 1; Mhlanga 2021: 484). The programme was piloted in 10 districts in 2011 but it was only in 2019 that the NHI Bill was passed by Parliament. This suggested a snail's pace in implementation of the NHI attributed to lack of political will and lack of funding (Pauw 2021: 1; Conmy 2018: 7; Bond 2014: 13). Also evident is the

lack of solidarity as the section of the population with the resources to finance a publicly funded universal health system is currently covered under private health insurance (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 46; Conmy 2018: 7). Providing an analysis of health care in South Africa before COVID-19, Conmy (2018) found the system ill-equipped to handle a catastrophic health situation (Conmy 2018: 7). This has been proven to be true following the outbreak of the pandemic. The influenza pandemic of 1918 led to the creation of a unified health system in South Africa. It remains to be seen whether COVID-19 will provide an impetus to the implementation of the NHI as the neoliberal policies in health continue to have a deleterious effect on low-income households (Bond 2007: 213).

4.5 Land and Agrarian Reform

While “political” apartheid might have ended, the social inequalities related to land dispossession policies remain alive (Conmy 2018: 6). Statistics from the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture (2019) reveal that 72 percent of agricultural land in South Africa is held privately in freehold and leasehold, 14 percent constitutes state land and the remaining 14 percent is held under customary law (RSA 2019: 43). This suggests that the legacy of the Natives Land Act of 1913 is still alive, and little has changed in addressing racial and gender land inequalities in South Africa more than two decades after independence. According to Gumede (2020), this is largely a result of the African National Congress government’s indecisiveness regarding land and agrarian reform (Gumede 2020: 7).

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which was the first economic blueprint of the ANC government, had an ambitious target of redistributing 30 percent of good farmland to black Africans within five years after independence (Bond 2000: 109). Due to the neoliberal policies adopted, in part due to external influence, particularly the World Bank, from 1994 until 2016 only 5.3 percent of white-held farmland was redistributed (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016). Reflecting the patriarchal nature of the land redistribution process, only 28.9 percent of land reform beneficiaries in South Africa are women (Greenberg 2010: 40). Kepe and Hall (2016: 37) place the percentage of women beneficiaries in the South African land reforms even lower at 23 percent (see also RSA 2019: 33).

Through the influence of the World Bank, a willing-buyer-willing-seller, market-based land reform was adopted. It provided a standard grant of R15,000 for the purchase of land equivalent to the housing subsidy (Bond 2000: 109). With the glacial speed at which land reform and delivery of land have progressed, there is growing discontent among the rural and urban masses alike with potential to cause widespread civil unrest in the country (Bond 2000: 110). While subsistence agriculture is not dominant in South Africa unlike

other sub-Saharan African countries, the potential of land redistribution in South Africa is a viable strategy for unemployment is yet to be adequately pursued (Aliber 2003, cited in Klaveren et al. 2009: 38).

However, indications are that households headed by whites receive 3.6 percent of their total income from capital whereas 9.6 percent of the total income of black African households is received from pensions, social insurance and family allowances. This implies that black South Africans do not own much by way of income-generating assets, particularly land (Gumede 2020: 9). From an intersectional perspective, COVID-19 had revealed that young black African women in urban areas can rarely rely on a fall-back scenario where they can go back to their families engaged in farming in the countryside (Klaveren et al. 2009: 4). Whether South Africa's land and agrarian sectors become an area of policy focus in the post-COVID-19 period remains to be seen. At the present moment, public hearings on the expropriation without compensation (EWC) programme are being analysed for onward submission to Parliament for approval.

4.6. COVID-19, Social Policy Innovations, Promising and Lasting Influences

Within the social assistance sector, a number of policy innovations sought to address the negative effects of the pandemic. These included topping up existing social grants and introducing new COVID-19 grants (Bhorat and Kohler 2021: 1). Notable was the introduction of the special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress (SRD) grant that was pegged at R350 per month. It was initially introduced for six months but latter extended until April 2021 (Bhorat and Kohler 2020: 1). The COVID-19 SRD grant targeted the "missing middle" aged 18 and above who were unemployed and not receiving any other social grant or support, including from the Unemployment Insurance Fund (Baskaran, Bhorat and Kohler 2020: 1). Estimates indicate that 9 million applications were processed by January 2021, and 6.5 million paid per month, amounting to R16 billion (PLAAS 2021). The figures reflect not only the impact of COVID-19 on employment but also the high level of unemployment in the country.

In addition to the COVID-19 SRD grant, were top-ups to all other social grants, particularly the CSG, which had an average top-up of R400 (\$30) per child and a per caregiver top-up of R500 (\$40) (Adesina 2021: 4). There were indications that women constitute a greater proportion of COVID-19-related job losses and more often than not, have not been contributing to the UIF. However, the eligibility criteria of the COVID-19 SRD grant, especially the one specifying not being receipt of any other social grant, the majority of CSG

recipients were women making many ineligible for the SRD grant (Bhorat and Kohler 2020: I; Gumede 2020: 12; Jain et al. 2020; Ranchhod and Daniels 2020).

Thus, the majority, particularly poor African women, were neither beneficiaries of UIF nor the COVID-19 SRD grant as the gender culture underlying social assistance programmes in South Africa, particularly the CSG, would confine them to the CSG top-up and the per caregiver top-up only. As a result, two-thirds of COVID-19 SRD grant recipients were confirmed to be men (Bhorat and Kohler 2020: i).

In general, the government's COVID-19 responses are being hailed in some quarters as progressive, particularly the conversion of the COVID-19 SRD grant into a Basic Income Grant (BIG) targeted at the "missing middle". However, others are of the view that the country remains locked in a neoliberal policy framework, with social policy doing little for gender equity and social transformation.

It is imperative to analyse the ideational basis on which policies are made. Providing relief to the poor is nothing inherently progressive. The size of the benefits being proposed for the BIG, even if there is an economic argument for it, is not designed to eliminate but relieve poverty, assisting the poor cope more with poverty.

Key Informant Interview, 6 September, 2021

On the other hand, some see it as a starting point for incremental development of universal as opposed to targeted social assistance.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic and labour market shocks, two laws became critically important in providing short-term income relief to workers, namely, the Unemployment Insurance Act, 2001 and Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act, 2002. There was a large-scale activation of the UIF as income replacement for workers affected by the national lockdown. As a labour market-based social insurance, the UIF provided a minimum of R3,500 and a maximum of R6,638 depending on salary level for a period of six months but only to those who had been making contributions to the Fund. Realising that most employers and employees affected by the pandemic were not eligible for the UIF, the government introduced the COVID-19 Temporary Employer/Employee Relief Scheme (COVID-19 TERS). This extended coverage to employers and employees requiring assistance from the UIF but not having been contributing.

This measure by the government, which is de-linked from normal UIF benefits, was progressive as it extended coverage to all workers irrespective of UIF contribution status. The COVID-19 TERS, complemented by the COVID-19 SRD grant, ensured that those in the

“missing middle” not covered by the UIF had access to some income to cushion them from the economic effects of the pandemic (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 36; Klaveren et al. 2009: 21). Highlighting the strength and relevance of a publicly managed national social insurance scheme, such as the UIF in South Africa, Adesina (2021) argued that it is difficult to imagine that the UIF could have played the role it did in protecting jobs and livelihoods if it was designed around market-based insurance models (2021: 5). Nevertheless, a gender analysis reveals the disproportionate representation of women, particularly black African women, in the informal sector. This suggests that many such women are not benefiting from the COVID-19 TERS which has monthly benefits pegged at R5,485 (US\$368) whereas beneficiaries of the CSG and caregiver top-ups barely receive US\$50.

While challenges in the South African health delivery system have been exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, some commentators believe that the pandemic provides an opportunity to strengthen the NHI and create additional health reforms informed by COVID-19 health care needs (Devermont 2020). Fundamental reform of the health delivery system is urgent when two-thirds of COVID-19 ventilators in the country are available only in private hospitals which the majority of the population cannot afford.

It must be acknowledged that within the health sector, the pandemic opened up clear opportunities for public-private interaction exemplified by the collaboration between the two sectors on issues such as capacity for COVID-19 testing, and the sharing of information and beds between the public and private providers. These are indications that a more integrated and multi-sectoral approach where the public and private sector work collaboratively towards the same goal is likely to be lasting and critical for the implementation of the NHI (*Key Informant Interview, 25 August 2021, Pretoria, South Africa*).

South Africa's three-pronged response – expansion of existing social grants; the special COVID-19 relief grants; and the COVID-19 Temporary Employer/Employee Relief Scheme – was successful in mitigating the potential livelihood crises that could have ensued with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The success of the COVID-19 TERS lies in its design as a publicly managed social insurance scheme instead of a market-based insurance model which was bound to fail to produce the same results (Adesina 2020). The latter forms one critical lesson that can be drawn from the South African experience.

5.0 CONCLUSION, KEY FINDINGS, LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- ✓ The liberal democratic as opposed to social democratic underpinnings of social policy pursued by the government in South Africa tends to be retrogressive when

compared with an otherwise progressive approach on the continent. This is exemplified in the American style of a welfare regime that provides minimal and stringent means-tested public welfare as opposed to universalism. As such, South Africa's decidedly liberal, "poor-centric" public healthcare provision is a cause for concern. Such an approach to social policy, from social assistance, education and healthcare provision to land and agrarian reform have negative implications for gender equitable transformation. The stratified, segmented and segregated social policy in South Africa is nowhere close to what can be called "transformative" social policy. In terms of employment, it has a tendency of producing highly inequalitarian labour markets that follow racial and gender lines.

- ✓ The South Africa context, despite massive social expenditure, exemplifies a fundamental disconnect between social and economic policy. This disconnect explains why the dominant part of the country's social policy is minimalist with the first call for social provisioning being the market from healthcare, education including land and agrarian reform. Despite a conservative Finance ministry obsessed with the availability of fiscal space to implement progressive social policies, there is need for the country to link its social policies to the country's growth policies through investing in human capital to expand the tax base. The key lesson for South Africa is that there is need for progressive social policies based on massive unemployment.
- ✓ The COVID-19 experiences in South Africa have revealed precisely the weaknesses of relying on the market for social provisioning. The market is always bound to fail. The pandemic exposed the massive differences between those with private social insurance and those without. This explains why the country has failed, in close to three decades, to make significant inroads in reducing poverty and inequality, especially gender-based inequalities.
- ✓ The implementation of the National Health Insurance scheme, the first universalistic social policy in South Africa, has great potential not only for equalizing access to health but also as a first significant step towards social policies based on principles of solidarity and equality. This signifies possible changes in regimes of value, particularly in the South African context.
- ✓ The pandemic may have deepened inequalities related to geography, race, class and gender. Meanwhile, arguments around shrinking fiscal space are being pushed not only outside but also within the state itself. If any lessons can be drawn from the 2008 financial crisis, there is danger of a deepening rather than a retreat of neoliberalism, which resonates with the statement by Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, UN Women Executive Director, "I am cautiously optimistic...cannot guarantee governments will do the right thing" (quoted from Gouws and Madsen 2021: 22).

In order to transition from the current state of social policy into a gender-transformed, post-COVID-19 South Africa, the following recommendations are made:

- **Constituency building.** As highlighted during key informant interviews, change does not come because historical conjecture coalesces around it; it comes about because people organise and drive change. While South Africa has had a vibrant, post-independence social movement, there has been a lack of a bargaining agenda for gender. There is a need for gender equitable and transformative social policies in the areas of menstrual and maternity leave for women, public provided day-care services, and breastfeeding facilities beyond what is stipulated in law. Absent in South Africa are any efforts towards socialising the burden of childbirth and care.
- The obsession of the South African women's movement with the democratisation of the public sphere (narrowly defined as the state) has been a major weakness in terms of the transformation of institutional cultural norms. Statutory bodies in South Africa such as the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) and the Commission for Employment Equity (CEE), with which connections have been established through this research, are key vehicles for driving gender equitable and transformative social policies in post-COVID-19 South Africa.
- **Advocacy for budget provision for child care.** The pandemic has affected many women of childbearing age (mainly in the 20s and 30s) who need to enter the labour market. Investment in care facilities would not only remove a large cost item from household budgets but also enable parents and unpaid caregivers to enter the labour market.
- Judging by the business stimulus packages that the government made available, with some recognition that women working in the services (and particularly the informal) sector have been highly affected by the pandemic, there is need for tailor-made interventions to ensure women benefit equally from these stimulus packages.
- A universalistic approach to social policy is the surest way to reap dividends in 15-20 years. Universalisation in education, health, social security and care predicated on quality needs emphasis, rather than the current piecemeal and scattered approaches. Policy makers need a change of mindset to view education and health not as expenditure but as investment.

REFERENCES

- Adam, G. (2020). The impact of the quintile funding system in reducing apartheid-inherited inequalities in education. Masters Dissertation. Stellenbosch University.
- Adesina, J. (2009). Social policy in sub-Saharan Africa: a glance in the rear-view mirror. *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 18(1): 37-51.
- Adesina, J. (2011). Beyond the social protection paradigm: Social policy in Africa's development. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 32(4): 454-470.
- Armstrong, P. and Burger, C. (2009). Poverty, Inequality and the Role of Social Grants: An Analysis using Decomposition Techniques. Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers: 15/09. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch.
- Beland, D. (2009). Gender, Ideational Analysis and Social Policies. *Social Politics* Vol. 16(4): 558-581.
- Bhorat, H. and Köhler, T. (2020). Social assistance during South Africa's national lockdown: Examining the COVID-19 grant, changes to the Child Support Grant, and post-October policy options. Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 202009. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.
- Bond, P. (2000). *Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa*. London: Pluto Press.
- Bond, P. (2007). The socio-political structure of accumulation and social policy in Southern Africa. In: J. Adesina (ed). *Social Policy in Sub-Saharan African Context. Social Policy in Development Context*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bond, P. and Ruiters, G. (2016). Uneven Development and Scale Politics in Southern Africa: What We Learn from Neil Smith. *Antipode*, Vol. 49, pp. 171-189.
- Bond, P. and Malikane, C. (2019). Inequality caused by macroeconomic policies during over accumulation crisis. *Development South Africa*. Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(6): 803-820.
- Braun, D. and Capano, G. (2010). Introductory Paper. The missing link-policy ideas and policy instruments. Prepared for the Workshop on "Ideas, Policy Design and Policy Instruments: Casting Light on the Missing Link". European Consortium for Political Research. Munster, Germany. March 23-27, 2010
- Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3(2), 77-101
- Brynin, M. (2017). The gender pay gap. Institute for Social and Economic Research. Colchester: University of Essex.
- Bosch, A. (2020). The gender pay gap: a guide for the already converted. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch Business School.
- Budeli, M. Kalula, E. and Chucks Okpaluba, C. (2008). Freedom of association and trade unionism in South Africa: From apartheid to the democratic constitutional order. Monograph 2 / 2008. The Institute of Development and Labour Law. Cape Town University of Cape Town.
- Burger, R. and Carmen Christian, C. (2020). Access to health care in post-apartheid South Africa: availability, affordability, and acceptability. *Health Economics, Policy and Law* 15(1): 43-55
- Burger, R. and Jafta, R. (2010b). Affirmative action in South Africa: An empirical assessment of the impact on labour market outcomes. Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), Working Paper No. 76 March.
- Butler, J., Rotberg, R. and Adams, J. (1978). *The black homelands of South Africa: The Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Commission for Employment Equity (2020). 20th Commission for Employment Equity Annual Report 2019/20. Pretoria: South African Department of Labour.
- Corvellec, H. and Hultman, J. (2016). Managing the politics of value propositions. *Marketing Theory*, December.
- Conmy, A. (2018). South African health care system analysis. University of Minnesota School of Public Health. Analytical Essay November.
- Das, S. and Kotikula, A. (2019). Gender-based employment segregation: Understanding causes and policy interventions. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Dass, S. and Rinquest, A. (2017). Amended national norms and standards for school funding. Government Notice no. 869. Government Gazette no. 29179 of 31 August 2006. Pretoria: Government Printer.

- Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. (2016). Riparian Rights of Farmers. Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Water and Sanitation. Parliament of South Africa, 20 November 2016. <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23583/>. Accessed 1 April 2020.
- De Austria, J. J. (2014). The fine line between gender equity and gender equality. *Research Journal of Social Science and Management*, Volume 4, Number 7, pp.1-4.
- De Villiers, K. (2021). Bridging the health inequality gap: An examination of South Africa's social innovation in health landscape. *Infectious Disease Poverty* 10(19): 1-7.
- Dube, B. (2020). Rural Online Learning in the Context of COVID-19 in South Africa: Evoking an Inclusive Education Approach. *Multidisciplinary Journal of Educational Research*, 10(2), 135-157
- Ferreira, G. M. (2005). Developments in labour relations in South Africa: Ten years of democracy (1994-2004). *Politeia* 24(2): 197-214. Pretoria: UNISA Press.
- Gouws, A. and Madsen, D. H. (2021) "We have to do much more, demand much more and I think demonstrate radical impatience": Conversation with Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, UN Women Executive Director. *Agenda*, 35(2): 18-24,
- Gradin, C. (2019). Occupational segregation by race after apartheid. *Review of Development Economics*. 23(2): 553-576.
- Greenberg, S. (2010). Status report on land and agricultural policy in South Africa. Research Report, Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, School of Government. Cape Town: University of the Western Cape
<https://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/10566/657>. Accessed 2 April 2020.
- Gumede, V. (2020). Elusive Pursuit of Reconciliation and Development in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Volume 42, No 2. Nov/Dec 2020
- Gumede, V. (2021). Revisiting Poverty, Human Development and Inequality in Democratic South Africa. *Indian Journal of Human Development*, Volume 15, Issue 2, pp. 1-17.
- Hassim, S. (2004). Voices, Hierarchies and Spaces: Reconfiguring the Women's Movement in Democratic South Africa. A case study for the UKZN project entitled: Globalisation, Marginalisation and New Social Movements in post-Apartheid South Africa.
- Hattersley, A. F. (1950). *The British Settlement of Natal: A Study in Imperial Migration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jain, R., Budlender, J., Zizzamia, R. and Bassier, I. (2020). *The labour market and poverty impacts of COVID-19 in South Africa*. Working Paper 2020-14. Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Jackson, C.A., van Vlaenderen, H. (1994). Participatory research: a feminist critique. *Psychology in Society*, 18, 3-20.
- Jisheng, X. (1987). Evolution of South Africa's Racist Constitutions and the 1983 Constitution. *Issue*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 18-23.
- Jordaan, C. and Ukpere, W. (2011). South African Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and Current Affirmative Action: An analysis of labour economic history. *African Journal of Business Management*, 5, 1093-1101.
- Kepe, T. and Hall, R. (2016). Land redistribution in South Africa. Commissioned Report for High-Level Panel on the Assessment of Key Legislation and the Acceleration of Fundamental Change. Parliament of South Africa, 28 September 2016.
- Klaveren, M., Tijdens, K., Williams M. and Martin N.R. (2009). An overview of women's work and employment in South Africa. Decisions for Life MDG3 Project Country Report No 3. University of Amsterdam.
- Kotz, D. M. and Hall, T. (2002). Globalisation and neoliberalism. *Rethinking Marxism*, Volume 12, Number 2, pp. 1-19.
- Leibbrandt, M., Woolard, I., McEwen, H. and Koep, C. (2010). Employment and inequality outcomes in South Africa. Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit Cape Town: University of Cape Town.
- Lister, R. (2006). Children (but not women) first: New Labour, child welfare and gender, *Critical Social Policy* 26; 315-335

- Macdonald, A.F. (1953). Politics in the Union of South Africa. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*.288(1):140-152.
- Mhlanga, D. (2021) A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Care in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *Nurs. Rep.*, 11, 484–494
- Mkandawire, T. (2001) Social Policy in a Development Context, Social Policy and Development Paper No. 25, Geneva: UNRISD.
- Mkandawire, T. (2004). Introduction. Social policy in a development context. In: Mkandawire, T. (ed). *Social policy in a development context*. Basingstoke: UNRISD/Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-33.
- Mkandawire, T. (2011). Welfare regimes and economic development: Bridging the conceptual gap. In: Fitzgerald, V., Heyer, J. and Thorp, R. (eds). *Overcoming the persistence of poverty and inequality*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Mariotti, M. 2009. Labour markets during apartheid in South Africa, ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 2009-503. Canberra: Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Matola, S. and Yusuf, S. (2009). No fee schools in South Africa. Policy Brief Number 7. Consortium for Research on Education, Access, Transition and Equity (CREATE), August.
- Naidoo, K., Stanwix, B. and Yu, D. (2014). Reflecting on the racial discrimination in the post-apartheid South African apartheid. Development Policy Research Unit Policy Brief, PB 14/39. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.
- Quanson, L. (2014). Gender Transformation in the Workplace and the Role of Trade Unions in South Africa: A Case Study of Rand Water. Masters Dissertation University of the Witwatersrand, April, 2014.
- Patel, L. Plagerson, S. (2016). The evolution of the Child Support Grant. Centre for Social Development in Africa. Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg.
- Pauw, T. L. (2021): Catching up with the Constitution: An analysis of National Health Insurance in South Africa post-apartheid. *Development Southern Africa*, 39:6, 921-934, DOI: 10.1080/0376835X.2021.1945911.
- Phiri, M. Z. (2020). Social assistance in national social policy architectures: A comparative study of South Africa's and Brazil's selected districts. PhD Thesis, University of South Africa Press.
- PLAAS. (2021). WEBINAR: The implication of the termination of the COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress (SRD) grant and the proposals moving forward. PLAAS. Cape Town: University of Western Cape.
- Sinden, E. (2017). Exploring the Gap Between Male and Female Employment in the South African Workforce. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 8(6), 37.
- Rein, M. (1973). Values, social science, and social policy. Working Paper No. 21. Cambridge: Joint Center for Urban Studies.
- Maziya, M., Sparreboom, T., Hertz, T. Alibor, M., de Jager, J. and Nakanyane, S. (2003). South Africa's labour markets and policies. *Economic and Labour Market Review*.
- Manual for Trainers Gender Equality and Gender Mainstreaming. (2014). Module 1, Gender, Gender Concepts and Definitions.
- Parker, R., Morris, K. and Hofmeyr, J. (2020). Education, inequality and innovation in the time of COVID-19. Johannesburg: JET Education Service.
- Pillay, I. (2021). The impact of inequality and COVID-19 on education and career planning for South African children of rural and low-socioeconomic backgrounds. *African Journal of Career Development*, 3(1), pp. 1-7.
- Ranchhod, V. and Daniels R. C. (2020). Labour market dynamics in South Africa in the time of COVID-19: Evidence from Wave 1 and 2 of the NIDS-CRAM survey. SADRU. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.
- Republic of South Africa. (2019). Final Report of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture, 4 May 2019, Pretoria.
- Samson, M., MacQuene, K. and van Niekerk, I. (2005). Social Grant: South Africa. Policy Brief. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Seekings, J. (2006). The Carnegie Commission and the backlash against welfare state-building in South Africa, 1931-1937. Centre for Social Science Research Working Paper No. 159. May. *Journal of Southern African Studies* Vol. 34, No. 3 (Sep., 2008), pp. 515-537.

- South Africa – Towards Inclusive Economic Development. (2019). Papers available at: SA-TIED (unu.edu).
- Subramanien, D.C. and Joseph, J.L. (2019). The Right to Strike under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) and Possible Factors for Consideration that Would Promote the Objectives of the LRA. *PER / PELJ* 2019(22) 1.
- Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. (2016). Gender Equality and Gender Equity. Gender Tool Box (Brief). Sundbyberg: SIDA.
- Tekwa, N. and Adesina, J. (2018). Gender, poverty and inequality in the aftermath of Zimbabwe's land reform: A transformative social policy perspective. *Journal of International Women's Studies*, 19(5), pp. 45-62.
- Terreblanche, S. (2010). The British empire after unification: 31 May 1910. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Available at: SJT-2010-The-British-Empire-100-years-after-unification.pdf (sun.ac.za).
- United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. (2006) Transformative Social Policy: Lessons from UNRISD Research. Research and Policy Brief No. 5. Geneva: UNRISD.
- UNRISD. (2010). Combating poverty and inequality: structural change, social policy and politics. Geneva: UNRISD.
- USAID. (2008). Gender equality framework. A report developed for the USAID Office of Women in Development by the EQUATE Project, Management Systems International. Available at: GENDER EQUALITY FRAMEWORK - PDF Free Download (docplayer.net) , May 2008.
- Van Rensburg, H. C. J. (2012). Health and health care in South Africa. Cape Town: Juta.
- Washington Center for Equitable Growth. (2017). Occupational segregation in the United States. September. Washington, D.C. Available at: 092717-occupational-seg.pdf (equitablegrowth.org)
- WIDER, U.N.U. (2019) The gender wage gap in post-apartheid South Africa. Research Brief 2019/2. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
- Wilson, V. (2021). Black women face a persistent pay gap, including in essential occupations during a pandemic. Working Economics Blog. Posted August 2, 2021. Economic Policy Institute.
- Yi, I. (2015). New challenges and new directions in social policy. Geneva: UNRISD. <https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/csocd/2016/new-directions-socialpolicy-CY.pdf>. (Accessed: 29 March 2017).
- Zembe, W. (2013). Good but not good enough: the limitations of a social assistance program for children in South Africa—the case of the Child Support Grant. DPhil Thesis. Department of Social Policy and Intervention. Oxford University, Oxford 2013.

Appendix 1: The Effects of the Bantu Homelands Act of 1976



These “homelands” or “Bantustans” included: Transkei and Ciskei for the Xhosa ethnic group; Bophuthatswana (Tswana ethnic group); Venda (Venda ethnic group), Gazankulu (Shangaan and Tsonga ethnic group); KaNgwane (Swazi ethnic group); KwaNdebele (Ndebele ethnic group); KwaZulu (Zulu ethnic group); Lebowa (Pedi and Northern Ndebele ethnic groups); and QwaQwa (for the Basotho ethnic group) (Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1978).